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Abstract
Scholars who point to political influences and the regulatory function of patent courts in the USA
have long questioned the courts’ subjective interpretation of what ‘things’ can be claimed as inven-
tions. The present article sheds light on a different but related facet: the role of the courts in regulat-
ing knowledge production. I argue that the recent cases decided by the US Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit, which made diagnostics and software very difficult to patent and which attracted
criticism for a wealth of different reasons, are fine case studies of the current debate over the
proper role of the state in regulating the marketplace and knowledge production in the emerging
information economy. The article explains that these patents are prospect patents that may be
used by a monopolist to collect data that everybody else needs in order to compete effectively. As
such, they raise familiar concerns about failure of coordination emerging as a result of a monopol-
ist controlling a resource such as datasets that others need and cannot replicate. In effect, the
courts regulated the market, primarily focusing on ensuring the free flow of data in the emerging
marketplace very much in the spirit of the ‘free the data’ language in various policy initiatives,
yet at the same time with an eye to boost downstream innovation. In doing so, these decisions
essentially endorse practices of personal information processing which constitute a new type of
public domain: a source of raw materials which are there for the taking and which have become
most important inputs to commercial activity. From this vantage point of view, the legal interpret-
ation of the private and the shared legitimizes a model of data extraction from individuals, the raw
material of information capitalism, that will fuel the next generation of data-intensive therapeutics
in the field of data-driven medicine.
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1. Introduction
The article discusses the troubled relationship between open datasets
and proprietary inventions in the field of data-driven medicine. The
analysis adopts the angle of critical scholarship enquiring into the
function of data as a valuable resource in the emerging information
economy (Benkler 2002; Castells 2000; Cohen 2017). One of the
central characteristics of the information economy is that since in-
formation is easily reproducible it creates a variety of ‘free informa-
tion’ versus ‘exclusive control’ problems which relate to the
intellectual property rights and openness distinction. The vehicle to
kick off my take on the problem is the recent cases decided by the
US Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, which made diagnostics
and software very difficult to patent.1 Courts in the USA have long
ago developed caselaw exempting natural phenomena and laws of
nature, mental acts, and abstract ideas from patent eligibility. These
‘things’ do not fall into the statutory categories of invention and
as such belong to the public domain or the nuanced notion of the
commons. Yet, any attempt by courts to mark the difference between
what can be claimed as private property and what belongs to the pub-
lic domain or the commons seems to invite a highly subjective inquiry,
and for this reason these decisions have been harshly criticized
(Sichelman 2014).2 At the same time, as I will argue, the distinction
between the private and the shared seems to be driven by explicit
concerns about the value of data in the information economy.
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Although scholarship has discussed extensively the recent cases
decided by the US Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit with
respect to the patentability of diagnostics and software and has
highlighted a wealth of different problems, one important facet has
escaped attention: the current debate within patent law between
what can be private property and what can be shared is largely a de-
bate over the proper role of the state in regulating the marketplace
and knowledge production in the emerging information economy.
To come to grips with this assertion, it is important to highlight the
particular function of private rights, patents, claiming inventions in
the field of data-driven medicine. Patents claiming diagnostics and
software are prospect patents. Kitch (1977) famously proposed that
these patents can be justified on the basis of an economic rationale
similar to the one justifying property rights to mineral resources.
Rather than the traditional justification of patents as rewarding
inventive activity (Ghosh 2004; Merges 2005; Yelderman 2015),
prospect patents are important business assets and primarily
serve the purposes of coordinating business transactions in the
marketplace. Importantly, they are a tool for collecting and proper-
tizing data, such as genotype–phenotype correlations, and for build-
ing private datasets that hold enormous value. In fact, it may be that
the data acquired, analyzed, and aggregated through practicing the
claimed invention may even be more valuable than the patent itself.
The reason is that such private datasets are potentially perpetual
monopolies, almost impossible to replicate and at the same time
essential to interpreting the results of diagnostic testing. As I explain
in detail, the ramifications are that a single inventor may control a
key technology in the field of diagnostics. What is more, a single
inventor may control valuable data that everybody else needs to
compete effectively.
An important aspect of prospect, information, and business asset
theories is that they imply a minimalist role for the state (Ghosh
2004). For the proponents of these patents, when the Supreme
Court in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs essentially
put correlations between the occurrence of disease and genetic dis-
position in the public domain, it effectively interfered with private
property rights which form the basis of exchange in markets. It has
been argued for example that it is more efficient to have one private
company controlling a database with mutations rather than multiple
private companies controlling small and incomplete datasets (Burk
2015). Other more skeptical scholars suggest that we should not
deny protection to all diagnostics but discipline market patent-based
exchanges to those that represent genuine inventions and control
any undesired effects after they have been granted (Simon and
Sichelman 2017).
The Supreme Court took a different view. It appears to acknow-
ledge the prospect function of patents, yet pointed to the problems
inherent in failure of coordination emerging as a result of a monop-
olist controlling a resource such as datasets that others need and
cannot replicate. In effect, the courts regulated the market, primarily
focusing on ensuring the free flow of data in the emerging market-
place very much in the spirit of the ‘free the data’ language in
various policy initiatives,3 yet at the same time with an eye to boost
downstream innovation. The last point is important. From this
vantage point, the dichotomy between private property and natural
phenomena and laws of nature, mental acts and abstract ideas
becomes an important object of study. These decisions not only
favored sharing the datasets (such as the correlations between
genotypes and phenotypes of disease); but they also favored the de-
velopment of specific industries relevant to the development and
patenting of the Big Data analytics and artificial intelligence (AI)
tools to mine the datasets, which are expected to fuel the next
generation of data intensive inventions that will transform both the
conduct of research and delivery of health care.
While historians (Beauchamp 2013; Dutfield 2009) and scholars
who point to political influences and the regulatory function of pa-
tent courts (Duffy 2010) have long questioned the courts’ subjective
interpretation of patent eligibility requirements,4 the present article
sheds light on a different facet: the role of the state in regulating
knowledge production. These decisions essentially endorse practices
of personal information processing which constitute a new type of
public domain: a source of raw materials which are there for the tak-
ing and have become most important inputs to commercial activity
(Cohen 2017; Edelman 2015). From this vantage point of view, the
legal interpretation of the private and the shared legitimizes a model
of data extraction from individuals, the raw material of information
capitalism, that will fuel the next generation of data-intensive
therapeutics in the field of data-driven medicine. The rationale for
intellectual property and shared resources is interconnected, they
feed into each other and raise a set of concerns about personal data
that are different from, yet link to the discussion over privacy or
data protection. This set of concerns is often neglected and needs
to be studied more extensively to better understand the workings of
information capitalism.5
2. Patenting laws of nature: diagnostics and
correlations
A patent is a species of property right that gives their owner a time-
limited right to exclude others from practicing the invention and
genetic inventions can be protected by patents if they fulfill certain
legal requirements. Patents on diagnostic uses are often referred to
as ‘disease gene patents’, and typically cover all known methods of
testing for a mutation. The invention is based on statistical observa-
tion of a genetic difference and a phenotypic difference (such as the
occurrence of disease), then the patent claims any method for testing
for that genetic difference. A typical diagnostic patent is written in
the following format: a method for diagnosing a predisposition for
disease X in a human subject which comprises obtaining a sample
from a patient, and determining the presence of biomarker Y, where
the presence of biomarker Y in the sample indicates a predisposition
for disease X. It follows that accurate interpretation of predispos-
ition to disease X requires a big dataset with genotype–phenotype
correlations with robust statistical observations.
In a series of recent decisions the US Supreme Court decided that
diagnostics are non-eligible subject matter. In Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,6 a case decided in 2012, the
court said that a patent covering a standard diagnostic method com-
prising of the steps of administering a drug, measuring the level of a
metabolite, and knowing based on the result whether to increase or
decrease the drug’s dosage, was unpatentable, as essentially claim-
ing, and thus preempting, a law of nature, the phenotype-genotype
correlations.7 It followed long established caselaw exempting
natural phenomena and laws of nature, mental acts, and abstract
ideas from the statutory categories of invention. Patents should
allow inventors to control some ‘things’ that embody such natural
phenomena and laws, acts, and ideas, but not the natural phenom-
ena and laws, mental acts and ideas themselves (Collins 2008: 12).
For Collins, the latter are a public domain resource that should be
‘“exacted from” the patentee and given to the public as a condition
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of the patentee’s right to exclude from the patentable embodiments
of an invention’.
How can a diagnostic test claim laws of nature such as correla-
tions between disease and biomarkers to the extent that others can-
not use the same scientific facts to come up with new diagnostics?
Answering this question is not straightforward. To answer it, let us
begin with the following observation: the court did not shy away
from peering into the motivations of patent owners explicitly
addressing the problem of opportunistic behavior. Right holders use
patents strategically to block competition from rivals. The court
explained that it declared Prometheus’ process as non-patent eligible
because the laws of nature recited by Prometheus’ patent claims ‘are
not themselves patentable, the claimed processes are not patentable
unless they have additional features that provide practical assurance
that the processes are genuine applications of those laws rather than
drafting efforts designed to monopolize the correlations.’8
Therefore, the court in Mayo decided that laws of nature (the
phenotype–genotype correlations) are patentable only if ‘enough’ is
added to the claim to ensure an application of the natural law is
being claimed. A patent must limit its reach to a particular, inventive
application of the law (Thambisetty 2016). Engaging in a typical
utilitarian calculus, the court reasoned that because those laws and
principles are ‘the basic tools of scientific and technological work,’
it may be that the patented process ‘forecloses more future invention
than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify. . .they threat-
en to inhibit the development of more refined treatment recommen-
dations that combine Prometheus’ correlations with later
discoveries.’9
Mayo essentially put diagnostics outside the remit of patent pro-
tection in the USA (Eisenberg 2015). The Court in Mayo said that
the problem with Prometheus’ diagnostics test is that it attempts to
monopolize the phenotype–genotype correlations, in other words
the statistical observations upon which the invention is based. The
Court thought the invention (the steps performing the diagnosis
such as taking a sample and determining the presence of a biomark-
er) and the dataset (with statistical observations between genotypes
and phenotypes of disease) as almost merging in one entity. The
right holder used the patented technology to build datasets and it is
the combined effect of control over both the diagnostic technology
and the datasets used for interpretation that threatens to inhibit fu-
ture invention in the field of diagnostics. This is an important point
and I will explain its significance more by looking at a subsequent
decision which applied the Mayo test, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc.10
Ariosa is an important case that applied the Mayo test stirring
again the debate over the question of non-patentability of diagnos-
tics. The discovery in question, cell free foetal DNA (cffDNA), was
a truly revolutionary medical test based on a non-invasive technique
(without the need to perform amniocentesis) to test for abnormal-
ities in the foetus. In late 1990s, the inventors, Dr Dennis Lo
(Chinese University of Hong Kong) and Dr James Wainscoat
(University of Oxford), discovered the presence of paternal DNA in
mother’s blood which had travelled from the foetus. Simply by tak-
ing blood from the mother they could reliably identify foetal DNA,
which would in turn allow them to diagnose certain foetal genetic
conditions such as Down Syndrome. The tech-transfer office of the
University of Oxford patented the test and then licensed the patent
exclusively to Sequenom. Ariosa, Sequenom’s competitor, chal-
lenged the validity of the patent and the patent was invalidated twice
in the US District Court in California, a decision affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and in 2016 the US
Supreme Court denied a petition to review the case.
As in Mayo, the decision was heavily criticized. Many argued
that non-invasive testing addresses a real medical problem involving
considerable intervention and producing a useful product that con-
siderably improves the quality of human life. Even the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Ariosa lamented that under
Supreme Court precedent it had no option other than to affirm the
decision of the district court ‘The application of the natural phenom-
enon unfortunately obliged us to divorce the additional steps from
the asserted natural phenomenon to arrive at a conclusion that they
add nothing innovative to the process.11 ‘The only subject matter
new and useful as of the date of the application was the discovery of
the presence of cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum.’12
Researchers already knew how to accomplish the individual steps of
(1) fractionating blood; (2) amplifying DNA; and (3) detecting char-
acteristics in amplified DNA.13 However, individual judges of the
Federal Circuit expressed their deep concerns, for instance Justice
Lourie explained that ‘it is unsound to have a rule that takes inven-
tions of this nature out of the realm of patent-eligibility on grounds
that they only claim a natural phenomenon plus conventional
steps.’14 According to this view, as with Prometheus’s diagnostic
test, Sequenom’s test involves considerable human intervention in
manipulating natural phenomena to perform a useful task. Human
intervention was needed to actually measure cffDNA for the specific
purpose of detecting abnormalities in the fetus. The question of pat-
entability should then be addressed by looking at whether the inven-
tion satisfies novelty and non-obviousness otherwise we may deny
protection to meritorious inventions.15 Clearly, this opinion follows
a long strand of judicial thinking that reflects pragmatism in reward-
ing useful inventions and protecting a nascent industry. 16
Yet, there is more a nuanced story to be told about these deci-
sions, one that highlights the role of the court in regulating the mar-
ket and indirectly promoting specific industries. An interesting
picture emerges when looking at Justice Dyk’s opinion (judge on the
Federal Circuit) concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing
en banc in Ariosa. He explains that the non-obviousness require-
ment and breadth of claims should screen out undeserving patents
(he too was skeptical about the Mayo test in that he thought that an
inventive concept can come from discovering something new in na-
ture even if it is applied in a conventional way). Yet, he recognizes
that ‘claims that extend far beyond the utility demonstrated by the
patent applicant and reduced to practice should be invalid, as they
too broadly preempt the use of the underlying idea by others.’17
Justice Dyk’s focus on preemption is important as it directly
addresses the reason why these patents can potentially preempt use
of the genotype-phenotype correlations. As the law allows appli-
cants to include few representative embodiments of the invention
and further permits the use of prophetic examples in the patent ap-
plication,18 it may ‘prevent claims that preempt future applications
of the law of nature by others,’ . . . Sequenom claimed more than it
taught: ‘any diagnosis of any disease, disorder, or condition. . . im-
permissible attempts to capture the entire natural phenomenon of
cffDNA rather than any particular applications thereof developed
and actually reduced to practice by the inventors’.19
The language of capture and monopolization reflects a different
type of concerns akin to ‘market failure’, where Adam Smith’s invis-
ible hand fails to guide privately owned resources to their socially
optimal uses in cases that economists refer to as involving ‘public
goods’, ‘natural monopolies’, and ‘externalities’. The court thought
that the diagnostic test at issue in Mayo and Ariosa claimed the
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correlations between disease and biomarkers to the extent that
others cannot use the same scientific facts and invest in new diagnos-
tics. The reason is that these patents by design generate valuable
data through their operation or use and effectively create undesir-
able monopolies. In other words, the problem lied in the inherent
capacity of the technologies to generate invaluable datasets with cor-
relations that competitors cannot replicate. The following section
will elaborate this point.
3. Coordination failure and data-generating
patents: regulating markets and knowledge
production
Recent literature has acknowledged the function of patents in data-
driven medicine as data collection points (Burk 2015; Simon and
Sichelman 2017).20 They describe these patents as ‘data-generating
patents’ or data aggregators, which refer to patents on inventions
involving technologies that by design generate valuable data through
their operation or use. For instance, genetic tests and medical devi-
ces produce data about patients. Internet search engines and social
networking websites generate data about users’ preferences. When
data-generating inventions are patented, the patentee has a monop-
oly over the uses of an invention, but at the same time the patentee
also effectively enjoys market power over the data generated by the
invention. Trade secret law further protects the patentee’s market
power over the data, even where the data is in a market distinct
from the patented invention and very importantly, the patentee will
continue to have a monopoly in this market even after the expiration
or invalidation of the patent.
Therefore, diagnostic patents are data collection points: they
provide their owner with a competitive advantage in generating a
database of mutations and other clinical information that will be dif-
ficult and costly for competitors to replicate (Simon and Sichelman
2017).21 The more people use a patented diagnostic the better and
more accurate the database. The textbook example is Myriad
Genetics: The company had a long-term monopoly on BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genetic testing, and thus compiled amounts of data on var-
iants in the BRCA genes (a proprietary database containing informa-
tion on 46,000 genetic variants), giving the company a competitive
advantage in the evaluation of rare BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants for
which the medical significance had not yet been documented in a
public database. As Myriad Genetics has refused to contribute to
public databases it has been criticized as essentially leveraging its
power in the data market by keeping such a database proprietary
(Conley et al. 2014).
Competitive advantage in the field of diagnostics depends, in
part, on the quality of the genetic data that companies can access,
thus retaining exclusive access to such information is a key business
strategy. Exclusive control of a patent portfolio for a particular dis-
ease field is used strategically to block competitors in the market for
genetic testing (Price 2015). In this respect, broad patent claims and
exclusive control arguably prevents widespread genetic testing
whose results could potentially enrich databases. Exclusivity also
prevents the building of more accurate datasets, as the commercial
standard of one company becomes the clinical standard, since other
companies are prevented from offering more accurate tests (Kane
2008).
Broad patents claims in ‘disease gene patents’, which typically
cover all known methods of testing for a mutation essentially give
patent owners too much power and create a coordination failure
problem: Reacting to a statement by Brief for American College of
Medical Genetics et al. Amici Curiae 7. the court in Mayo agreed
that patents on the one hand provide incentives to innovate, on the
other hand, exclusive control can ‘impede the flow of information
that might permit, indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising
the price of using the patented ideas once created, requiring poten-
tial users to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing
patents and pending patent applications, and requiring the negoti-
ation of complex licensing arrangements.’22
The problem is exacerbated as rebuilding datasets is not easy
(Oliver 2015). Even if all competitors cooperated, contributing their
data to a public database would not appear to be a viable alterna-
tive, which means that ‘private ordering’ solutions (using liability
rules as in the case when a patent pool is formed) may not always be
feasible (Simon and Sichelman 2017). Arguably, such barriers invite
regulatory intervention (Williamson 1974).23 Without a patent on
the upstream technology the follow-on innovators can freely decide
whether to invest in downstream innovation.
These considerations bring together diverse inventions such as
software, diagnostic, and gene-related patents, all excluded from pa-
tent eligibility as natural phenomena, laws of nature and abstract
ideas.24 Software, diagnostic, and gene-related patents are tools to
collect data and in this sense rely upon ‘network effects’, the benefits
of having many users. Google’s famous software patent on
PageRank technology is a good example illustrating these benefits.
The PageRank technology is an algorithm used by Google Search to
rank web pages in their search engine results. To determine which
pages are most important, PageRank counts link votes. The scores
are then used together with many other factors to determine if a
page will rank well in a search. Although PageRank is one part of
Google’s page ranking system, when Google made the metric vis-
ible25 it fueled a whole market of link brokering, as people begun to
put links in blog posts and forums to chase higher scores. At the
same time, the popularity of PageRank gave the company early on
the possibility to attract users and collect data that it could aggre-
gate to improve its underlying product (the PageRank technology),
as well as to expand into secondary markets such as targeted online
advertisement (Simon and Sichelman 2017). Companies such as
google effectively utilize the data to better understand what users
want, and to this effect currently use artificial intelligence to mine
data from multiple sources.
Diagnostic technologies function in the same way. To give an-
other example illustrating their function as data collection points let
us take the example of Stanford University patents for a method for
assessing embryo development and viability in order to improve IVF
success rates. US patent 7,963,906 B2 claims ‘a method for assessing
the potential for developmental competence of a human embryo uti-
lising certain parameters’. The patent has been granted by the US pa-
tent office, with an equivalent granted by the European Patent
Office. It describes a process whereby thousands of pictures are
taken during the first few days of an IVF embryo’s life and research-
ers use the patented method to pick the healthiest embryos to be
implanted into the womb. The success rates of the diagnostic depend
on the quality of the dataset used for interpreting results. At the
same time, the more people are tested the more accurate the data-
base. The database can be used to improve the product and as the
product is improved it attracts more users and becomes the clinical
and commercial standard. A different but important point concerns
expansion in neighboring markets as a database with millions of
images with embryos at various stages of development can be mined
with artificial intelligence systems together with data from other
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sources for a variety of different medical purposes. I will return to
discuss this last point later.
We are now in a position to appreciate the criticism of the deci-
sions in a different light. The story about building datasets and using
patents as a tool to this effect implicate the ‘prospect theory’ of pat-
ents (Burk 2015). Rather than reward inventors for their efforts, the
prospect theory in economic thinking links to a very different set of
justifications. Kitch (1977) famously proposed that patents can be
justified on the basis of an economic rationale similar to the one jus-
tifying property rights to mineral resources. According to Kitch
physical resources such as minerals can be exploited in a coordi-
nated fashion by granting rights in mineral prospects and the same
should be true for intangibles. A fundamental assumption of the the-
ory is that prospect patents need to be broad and foundational, as
they are granted early on in the discovery process and aim at ending
rivalry by allowing one inventor to control a key technology. To
take the example of Myriad’s patent, proponents of the theory
would argue that it is best to have one private company controlling
a database with mutations rather than multiple private companies
controlling small and incomplete datasets.
Kitch was inspired by the prospect theory of property in tangi-
bles developed by Demsetz (1967), which is based on the fundamen-
tal utilitarian idea that private ownership creates a self-interested
incentive to exploit and develop an exhaustible resource. If people
are free to act in certain ways with respect to their property, they
would be likely to better satisfy their preferences. Rights to possess
and use property advances individual welfare and the net welfare
created in society. Given that physical resources are exhaustible the
theory offers a solution to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ which might
occur as a result of over-exploiting the exhaustible resource in ques-
tion. Kitch’s theory is essentially a theory of management of intellec-
tual resources: patents as coordination points prevent duplicative or
haphazard development of the invention.
The prospect theory of patents is strongly criticized for a variety
of reasons. To name a few, unlike physical resources, intellectual
property is non-rivalrous and essentially inexhaustible; prospect pat-
ents do not leave room for redistribution; rivalry migrates in down-
stream markets (Sideri and Panagopoulos unpublished data). Here I
would like to concentrate on Burk’s analysis of the prospect theory
of patents in precision medicine, which emphasizes the particular
problems inherent in the data generating patents functioning as data
collection points: Commenting on Myriad’s BRCA patents Burk
(2015: 249) notes:
Kitch’s pioneering intellectual property analyses, concerning the
development of unpatented but valuable information patent is
not so much the tool that allows a single entrepreneur to coordin-
ate development of the patented technology itself as it is the tool
that allows coordination of associated know-how. If patents are
to be compared to mineral rights, the benefit in this case is per-
haps not the facility of the property right in coordinating the or-
derly extraction and processing of the ore, so much as it is the
ability of the property right to organize placement of outbuild-
ings and systematic scheduling of the crew around the mine.
But this coordination of non-patent data creates problems: aggrega-
tion of proprietary information essentially allows the patent holder
to extend exclusivity beyond the term of the patent. In fact, the data
aggregated around the patent may be potentially kept proprietary
as it can be protected as a trade secret. Trade secrets in datasets can
be perpetual monopolies since independent discovery or reverse
engineering are not available options to competitors. As already
explained, aggregated data such as genotype–phenotype correlations
are almost impossible to recreate. The result may be monopoly pric-
ing or even using the data to extend one’s monopolistic position in
neighboring markets.
To summarize the above discussion, Mayo and Prometheus can
be seen as examples of market regulation. This approach challenges
the traditional dichotomy between human invention that society
needs to reward and a ‘sort of public library in the cosmos packed
with “manifestations” of natural laws, marked by open access’
(Simon 2008: 2189). Prospect patents serve the purposes of coordi-
nating transfer of technology and securing financing and venture
capitalist investment. Prospect patents epitomize the emphasis on
commercial exchange and are justified as a tradable commodity, an
important investment asset. They reflect the real world of patents as
business assets, strategic weapons to strike deals, attract investment,
or amass big patent portfolios for the purpose of cross-licensing.26
Diagnostic patents claiming diagnostic methods have the additional
capacity to aggregate genomic data which are essential to operating
the claimed invention and very difficult to recreate. The court deci-
sions discussed earlier effectively said that it is better not to have a
patent on the upstream technology so that follow-on innovators can
freely decide whether to invest in downstream innovation or not.
It follows that an important characteristic of prospect patents is
that they provide for a baseline for contractual exchange and a
mechanism for resolving disputes over conflicting uses of resources.
From a market regulation perspective, this approach implies a min-
imalist role for government. If government intervenes it will destroy
incentives to work. If government does not respect individual rights
people will not produce utility and there will be very little sum of
total utility in a society. From this vantage point, for those in favor
of a minimal role for the government one way to criticize the deci-
sions is that they implicate a role for the government in regulating
the market. Remember that standard neoclassical economics recog-
nizes only two property regimes: either ownership is vested in pri-
vate parties or it resides with the state. The usual economic
approach to property law suggests that productive efficiency will be
enhanced when private property is the norm, but government inter-
venes in cases of market failure in the interests of aggregate effi-
ciency. What this means for the diagnostics market is that for those
in the ‘minimalist government’ camp denying patent protection
automatically implies government intervention such as for example
by means of forcing private companies to share the correlations in
public datasets.
Yet, there are solutions outside the private property-government
control dichotomy. In Anglo-American jurisprudence the concept of
‘inherently public property’ recognizes that property can be owned
and managed by society at large (Rose 1986), an idea whose intellec-
tual roots dates back to the Romans. In economics, the pioneering
work of Elinor Ostrom (1990) shows a wealth of real world exam-
ples such as irrigation, where resources are owned and managed by
social groups. In the latter case, property is both a legal institution
and a human invention for solving practical problems (Fennell
2011). Exchange depends to a great extent on shared norms and
reputation, and resonates with anthropologists’ description of the
mode of operation of gift economies.
Taking a cue from Ostrom’s work, Evans (2014) discusses data-
sharing activities after Myriad. She notes that voluntary cooperation
emerges in examples of self-organized, self-governing collectives
that have managed irrigation, meadowlands, and forests in the past
and the same ethos can be seen in the efforts of the National
Institutes of Health to promote data sharing. She argues that
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voluntary sharing coupled with compulsory disclosure and market-
oriented approaches could address the coordination problem in cre-
ating a market for genetic data. Indeed, numerous online databases
exist, which differ with respect to their size, accessibility, and type
of data stored. An example is the Clinical Genome Resource
(ClinGen) project funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
in the USA that created a centralized resource of clinically annotated
genes to improve interpretation of genomic variation, and the
GA4GH BRCA Challenge. Some argue that the human genetics
community is adapting to a new paradigm of publicly sharing data-
sets (Brookes and Robinson 2015) At the same time, laboratories
could also use market solutions and charge a cost-based fee for
giving access (Evans 2014).
In fact, recent work on data-sharing initiatives by Villanueva
et al. (2019: 7) shows that ‘there are many sources of data, many
users of data, and many research and health care institutions pursu-
ing data-sharing functions that are only somewhat aligned. . .
Disparate actors with different roles work to collect and manage the
data and build the networks that make the data useful for biomed-
ical research, clinical care, and public health’. The authors further
explain that rather than a single global Medical Information
Commons (MIC) ‘MIC captures the goal of sharing and linking data
so that it can be transformed into information, and ultimately
knowledge. . .the MIC is a collection of many different health-
related commonses (or common pool resources) that would benefit
from the widespread adoption of a group of high-level but flexible
principles’.
This is an insightful comment, and perhaps a way to visualize it
is by using the metaphor of a highway connecting data structures
(rather than the idea of a global commons) which requires some sort
of common rules. Yet, the point relevant to the present analysis is to
show the market regulation effects of Mayo. Recognizing the patents
as data collection points and prospects, Mayo essentially implies the
need for either government regulation or the existence of a commons
(or plural commons) and the need to foster a sharing ethos. Yet, the
discussion on openness often takes a far too optimistic perspective.
A point that is often undeveloped in the current discussions on com-
mons and sharing concerns the important synergies between intellec-
tual property and the public domain. Chandler and Sunder (2004)
eloquently name this approach as ‘the romance of the commons’,
the belief that because a resource is open to all by operation of the
law, it will be exploited by all on equal terms. The reality is that
equality of opportunity is hampered by social circumstances and dif-
ferent levels of knowledge and wealth. The result is that some will
be more able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by open
access. Indeed, as the following section will explain, the ones that
will take advantage of the new commercial opportunities afforded
by sharing are the private actors that will develop the new diagnos-
tics, medical devices, and AI powered data-mining platforms.
4. From diagnostics to therapeutics: data
analytics and the reinvention of therapy
The analysis of the data collection function of patents leads to the
following observation with regard to the policy implications of
the decisions: datasets of genotypes and phenotypes may potentially
belong to a commons or diverse commons(es). Yet at the same
time, these sharing arrangements coexist with private rights, the
new generation of data-generating patents: the Artificial Intelligence
(AI) tools to mine the data to predict medical events and tailor
treatments, and digital therapeutics to manage disease. Importantly,
the nature of therapeutics and meaning of therapy is changing as
healthcare and pharmaceutical companies are partnering with AI
biotech companies, and AI companies partner with hospitals and
universities (Brayne et al. 2018). Cook-Deegan et al. (2019, f/n 2)
explain:
The sources of data include databases created for many different
purposes. In genomics, most were created to collect data for
researchers, but many genomic databases are now used in health
care. Some databases, such as cancer registries, were established
for public health surveillance, but are highly useful for both re-
search and clinical care. Testing laboratories are a direct source
of many data—for example, genomic testing laboratories, clinical
laboratories, and imaging facilities. Moreover, as medical records
are increasingly digitized, unstructured data are being trans-
formed into forms that enable analysis of health outcomes and
for other purposes. Also, many efforts are underway to integrate
social determinants of health, genomic, imaging and laboratory
data into electronic health records. The users of data include sci-
entists hoping to understand biology or disease, but also health
professionals helping individuals make decisions about health
care interventions, counseling them about the meaning of data.
Increasingly, individuals are using health and genomic data
themselves.
In the future complete genomes of populations with phenotype
data will be stored in Electronic Health Records (EHRs) and will
further be integrated with other multi-omics results and environ-
mental information, at least in high-resource clinical settings (price
forthcoming). Storing all this data in EHRs will allow their mining
with the aid of powerful algorithms and applications linking to-
gether diverse datasets.27 In this scenario, biomedicine meets
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and together they will drive both discov-
ery and health care interventions through high-dimensional analysis
of deep genomes and deep phenomes (Frey 2019). Researchers will
be able to study phenotypes at different levels such as drug-dose re-
sponse versus longitudinal analyses, as EHRs will offer large
amounts of data, the ability to analyze data over time, and the cap-
acity to include diverse datasets such as pictures, radiological data,
and biometric data collected from mobile applications (Wei and
Denny 2015).
A good example is a Google patent application from early 2019
for a ‘system and method for predicting and summarizing medical
events from electronic health records’. The patent claims a deep
learning system that aggregates EHR data from a variety of sources
into a ‘timeline’ in order to predict adverse events.28 The patent
claims an electronic device that predicts future clinical events such
as unplanned transfer to intensive care unit, length of stay in a hos-
pital greater than 7 days, unplanned readmission within 30 days
after discharge of the patient, inpatient mortality, primary diagnosis,
a complete set of primary and secondary billing diagnoses, or atyp-
ical laboratory values, such as acute kidney injury, hypokalemia,
hypoglycemia, and hyponeutrimia’.29 The claimed system includes a
‘computer memory’ or database for storing aggregated structured
and /or unstructured EHR data, a computer or processing unit to
execute machine-learning models trained on the data, and an end-
user device, such as a tablet or workstation, that shows healthcare
providers the results. The patent also describes the friendly user
interface and ‘The system of claim 2, wherein at least one of the one
or more deep learning models each contain an attention mechanism
indicating how much attention the at least one of the one or more
models gave to elements in the electronic health record to predict
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the one or more future clinical events and summarize pertinent past
medical events related to the predicted one or more future clinical
events, and wherein the display of the notes or excerpts thereof are
displayed in a manner indicating results from the application of the
attention mechanism’.30
The line between therapeutics, medical devices, and digital
health is becoming blurred. Let us take the example of Verily, for-
merly the Google Life Sciences division, now Alphabet Inc., which is
working at the intersection of data science and healthcare. Verily
has a number of partnerships to develop tools to collect and
organize health data, and make predictions and recommendations.
It collaborates with Alcon, Biogen, Dexcom, Ethicon, GSK,
Galvani, Nikon, Sanofi, Verb Surgical, 3 M, Bringham and Womens
Hospital, NHS Hospitals, Duke University School of Medicine,
Parkinson Net, Radbound University and Stanford Medicine.31
To give an example of products that these partnerships generate
let us take the example of Onduo, a joint venture between Sanofi and
Verily. The idea is to combine hardware (glucose sensors), software
(AI), and digital impetuses (reminders) to help people with diabetes
manage their condition. These are patents for method plus device,
and claim AI powered medical devices. Another example is a newly
granted Verily patent32 that offers a non-invasive system for diagnos-
ing a diverse array of medical conditions, including hormonal issues,
infections, and even cancer. The system uses a wearable device to
monitor and asses a substance that is inserted or ingested into body.
5. Redefining therapy: digital therapeutics
There has been an explosion of health mobile apps, designed to help
improve health and patient self-care and manage disease, named
Digital Therapeutics. They receive market authorization as medical
devices by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and are
prescribed by physicians in a way similar to medicines. Digital
therapeutics often target chronic diseases and neurological disor-
ders, cases where there is need for self-management and tailoring
treatment to individual cases.
Looking at the patents protecting digital therapeutics reveals an
interesting picture: What all these patents have in common is first,
they claim AI-driven technologies and second the devices and
platforms are protected by data-generating patents: they collect a
variety of user physiological data (such as blood pressure, pulse rate,
respiration rate, skin temperature) transmitted to a mobile device,
computer, or the cloud, which can be accessed by a physician.
The readings will then be compared to known normal parameters
and, if abnormal, will generate recommendations for the user of
the device. This is the new market for Digital Therapeutics, where
diagnostics and treatment recommendations rely upon behavioral
and lifestyle changes usually generated by collection of a variety of
different data. Treatments are being developed for the prevention
and management of a wide variety of diseases and conditions,
including type II diabetes, Alzheimer’s disease, substance abuse,
ADHD, and depression.
Bryn Roberts, Global Head of Operations for Roche
Pharmaceutical Research & Early Development, explains33:
The data we collect with the digital biomarker apps fall into two
classes: 1) active test data, where the subject performs specific
tasks on a daily basis, and 2) continuous passive monitoring
data, where the subject carries the device (e.g. smartphone) with
them as they go about their daily lives and sensors, such as accel-
erometers and gyrometers, collect data continuously. . . ... We
apply Deep Learning to do this activity-performance classifica-
tion, or Human Activity Recognition (HAR), using deep artificial
neural networks that have been trained using well-annotated
datasets.
Roche has a grand vision:
I’m intrigued by the general trend towards empowering individu-
als to share their data in a secure and controlled environment.
Democratization of data in this way has to be the future. Imagine
what we will be able to do in decades to come, when individuals
have access to their complete healthcare records in electronic
form, paired with high-quality data from genomics, epigenetics,
microbiome, imaging, activity and lifestyle profiles, etc., sup-
ported by a platform that enables individuals to share all or parts
of their data with partners of their choice, for purposes they care
about, in return for services they value—very exciting!34
Sensors and AI platforms can potentially collect physical biomet-
rics, such as facial images, iris patterns and heartbeat, and behavior-
al biometric data such as touch dynamics, keystroke dynamics and
gait recognition, voice ID, mouse use characteristics, and signature
analysis. These physical and behavioral biometric data can be
further analyzed to reveal cognition and emotion (cognitive bio-
markers). Cognitive biometrics is a novel approach to user authenti-
cation/identification and relies on the response of the subject when
they are presented with a particular stimulus (for instance a sound)
acquired through a variety of techniques such as eye trackers (pupil-
ometry) and electrocardiograms (Palaniappan and Revett 2014).
Ultimately quantifying a person’s cognitive biometrics will serve the
purpose of forming ‘digital phenotypes’ revealing cognitive and
emotional states (Palaniappan and Revett 2014). We see that the
dimensionality of data is bigger than it first appears. Data can be
subject to multiple independent measurements and can be used for a
variety of different purposes, a fact that confers enormous power
and a commercial advantage to owners of big datasets and algo-
rithms. The data-generating patents are even stronger than before,
as companies not only own data but also the algorithms to mine
them.
A potential market where power may be leveraged is drug reposi-
tioning, which refers to the discovery of new uses of previously
approved drugs and vaccines. Let us take the example of IBM
Watson Health. IBM Watson is being used at Memorial Sloan
Kettering Cancer Center to support diagnosis and create manage-
ment plans for patients. To come up with management plans, the al-
gorithm mines medical reports, patient records, clinical trials, and
medical journals. What is more, Johnson & Johnson and IBM are
using AI to analyze scientific papers to find new connections for
drug development.35 IBM machine-learning algorithms work on
vast amounts of observational real-world data accessed through
IBM Watson Health, as well as on drug information from pharma-
cological knowledge bases, such as DrugBank, to test hundreds of
candidates for repurposing in various disease domains.36
Pharmaceutical companies will reinvent themselves and will need to
develop IT capabilities or collaborate with the IT companies that
will develop the AI tools.
6. Conclusions: from market regulation to the
political economy of informational capitalism
The recent caselaw on the distinction between invention and unpa-
tentable laws of nature and natural phenomena, mental acts, and ab-
stract ideas offers a fascinating case study of the function of patents
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as prospects and the role of courts as market regulators. The public
domain or commons and intellectual property are not independent
realms, but rather intimately intertwined. The phenotype–genotype
correlations not only become a shared resource; they also fuel the
new inventions in the field of digital therapeutics and the companies
offering Big Data and AI analytics are uniquely positioned to take
advantage of the opportunities stemming from sharing and
openness.
In this sense, there is a lot to be said about the function of patents
as a property institution that plays a fundamental role in the polit-
ical economy of data and knowledge production. Cohen notes that
scholarship on the relationship between law and the collection and
processing of personal information typically considers such activities
as raising problems of privacy or data protection (Cohen 2017), and
typically focuses on ways to regulate related activities after collec-
tion has taken place. Yet, this view disguises the processes for re-
source extraction mediated by patents and the ways in which the
processing and sharing of personal information in data commons
becomes a public domain resource that is there for the taking.
It follows that the division between patentable inventions and
unpatenable laws of nature and natural phenomena, mental acts,
and abstract ideas is an intriguing distinction showing how a par-
ticular society thinks about patterns of resource ownership: what is
private and what is common and for what reason. In the case of
diagnostics, we see culturally situated ideas about both resource
ownership and availability. The cultural construct of a public do-
main designates data as a resource and suggests ways they can be
used to advance data-driven medicine. The commons legitimizes the
ensuing patterns of appropriation as patents become artifacts of
datafication. At the same time, as a property institution firmly
grounded on offering a mere baseline for contractual exchange, pro-
spect patents have very little to say about distribution.
On a more general level, the analysis suggested that intellectual
property is not something that follows from openness, a necessary
evil or an element parasitically attached to it; it is there from the
start and colors the nature of openness. At the same time, if we look
inversely as through a mirror, openness may link with a variety of
different theories justifying the proprietary. The last point is import-
ant: neither the idea of commons nor the idea of private property
need to link necessarily to commercialization; private property may
be justified according to theories of human flourishing or desert and
the commons may link to democratic debate.37 Our current idea of
commons and private property is a particular historical construction
reflecting ideas about a particular configuration between markets,
data, and medicine. In light of the above, I hope the present analysis
contributed to our understanding of the nature of openness and its
relation to property arrangements.
Notes
1. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 US
(2012); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 US 208,
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), at 12 (quoting Mayo).
2. Since Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980), where
the US Supreme Court declared that Congress [US Patent Act
§101 on Subject Matter Eligibility] had intended patentable
subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made
by man’, the patent eligibility test has been given a very nar-
row interpretation.
3. A real-world example is President Obama’s Precision
Medicine Initiative in the USA. In 2016, the US Congress
authorized $1.455 billion to fund the Initiative. Currently, the
All of Us Research Program builds on the latter initiative and
seeks to gather data from one million people living in the USA
to accelerate research and improve health. Another example
is the National Health Service (NHS) England,3 which has
announced that from October 2018 people will have wide ac-
cess to DNA tests and the NHS will become the first health
service in the world to routinely offer genomic medicine.
Hospitals will be connected to specialist centres that interpret
patient DNA to help diagnose rare diseases and determine
best treatment, building on the 100,000 Genomes Project,
the DNA sequencing project administered by Genomics
England, see NHS England, ‘Improving Outcomes through
Personalised Medicine’ available at https://www.england.nhs.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/improving-outcomes-person
alised-medicine.pdf website visited on 27 July 2018; Sample,
I. ‘Routine DNA tests will put NHS at the ’forefront of medi-
cine’ story published in the Guardian on 3 July 2018 available
at https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/jul/03/nhs-rou
tine-dna-tests-precision-cancer-tumour-screening website vis-
ited on 27 July 2019.
4. Lemley and Burk (2003) also show how the Federal Circuit
has tailored patent rules to boost specific industries such as
biotechnology and software. The latter scholars even favor a
more intrusive role for courts, suggesting the use of patent
law as a policy lever.
5. The discussion on data protection and privacy falls outside
the scope of the present discussion due to space limits. Note
that one major limitation inherent in private and data protec-
tion law, such as the General Data Protection Regulation in
the EU, concerns their focus on granting individuals control
over inputs of personal data undergoing processing, and
granting the right to rectify, block, or erase their data, yet Big
Data analytics and artificial intelligence (AI) draw inferences
about groups of individuals rather than use personal health
information (Wachter and Mittelstadt 2019). For the limits of
informed consent regimes, see Cohen (2013). For the prob-
lems inherent in granting individuals property rights to their
data see Murphy (1996); Barrad (1992); Samuelson (2000).
6. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289 (2012).
7. US Patent Act §101 on Subject Matter Eligibility states that
the four statutory categories of invention are Process,
Machine, Manufacture, or Composition of Matter and courts
have developed caselaw exempting natural phenomena and
laws of nature, mental acts, and abstract ideas/as not falling
into the statutory categories of invention.
8. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 US
(2012) Opinion of the Supreme Court, on Writ of Certiorari
to the US Court of Appeals For The Federal Circuit, at p. 12.
9. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 US
(2012) Opinion of the Supreme Court, on Writ of Certiorari
to the US Court of Appeals For The Federal Circuit, at p. 68.
10. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
11. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282,
1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
12. Ibid.
13. Ariosa v. Sequenom 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
14. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282,
1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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15. Sichelman (2014) traces the ‘inventive concept’ approach of
the Mayo test in Funk Brothers Seed Co v. Kalo Inoculant Co
and warns against the possibility of its expansive application.
16. It is useful to draw an analogy with products of nature to
understand the point about rewarding useful inventions. For
example, Beauchamp (2013) notes that the doctrine of ‘useful
difference’ in purified natural products essentially made iso-
lated natural substances the subject matter of a valid patent
and was established in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford
Co., a century-old decision by Justice Learned Hand. It was
decided that an isolated and purified natural substance could
be patentable, so long as the greater utility of the purified ver-
sion made it functionally a new thing. The doctrine reflected
pragmatism in rewarding useful inventions. Graham Dutfield
(2009) further explains that around the time of the decision,
the US chemical sector was facing a crisis. Germany’s compe-
tence was in synthesis while the US excelled at isolation and
purification. But as any resulting substances could be very
easily reverse engineered, patent protection was thought to
be essential to protect from Germans free riding on the US
industry’s efforts. In other words, by holding that purified
adrenaline was different from the natural product because it
had new functionality, Judge Learned Hand essentially pro-
tected a nascent industry.
17. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282,
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Justice Dyk.) at p. 1287.
18. The patent enablement requirement refers to the requirement
of 35 U.S.C. §112 which requires that the patent specification
describes the invention in sufficient detail so that other can
make and use it.
19. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282,
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Justice Dyk.) at p. 1287
20. This approach challenges the dominant position in the litera-
ture is to describe patents and trade secrets as substitutes
(companies decide either to patent or protect by trade secrets;
also see Sherkow and Scott, forthcoming, where the authors
explain that since patent disclosure requirements are not al-
ways rigorous, inventors may keep certain aspects of an in-
vention secret, yet still receive a patent to the invention as a
whole).
21. The authors explain that traditional defenses in trade secrecy
law such as reverse engineering are not applicable which
means that trade secrets in data may function as perpetual
monopolies.
22. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 US
(2012) Opinion of the Supreme Court, on Writ of Certiorari
to the US Court of Appeals For The Federal Circuit, at pp.
16–19.
23. A separate but related argument for regulatory intervention
points to the considerable public financing of discovery of
diagnostic technologies, as Universities were primarily the
inventors (Ouellette and Weires, forthcoming).
24. Indeed, the similar rationale for denying patent protection to
diagnostics can be found in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International, where the court applied the Mayo test to ab-
stract ideas, and like Mayo, called into question the patent-
ability of a large class of inventions, here software.
25. Since 2016, google confirmed that it is removing PageRank
from its Toolbar, so people cannot see how their website
scored (in a scale between 0 and 10). Ranking will no longer
be visible to anyone except Google itself.
26. While ex ante justifications of patents are based on the idea
that incentives are required for the creation of knowledge,
pharmaceutical patents are often described in the economics
literature as prospect patents and are justified as providing
incentives for the management of knowledge goods after they
have been created. Prospect or commercialization patents are
justified on the basis of ex post justifications, see Sideri and
Panagopoulos (unpublished data). As Lemley (2004) explains
these ex post justifications stress the need for incentives to de-
velop, improve, or control overuse of information.
27. Note that for this to happen there are considerable technical
problems to be resolved first (Price, forthcoming).
28. System and Method for Predicting and Summarizing Medical
Events from Electronic Health Records United States Patent
Application 20190034591.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. After Myriad, Prometheus, and Alice, types of patents
allowed are Patents for methods plus system (i.e. a memory
and a processor) see https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/clas
sification/uspc706/defs706.htm
31. https://verily.com/projects/ website visited on 29 August
2019.
32. Patent US20150238636A1for ‘Engineered particles with po-
larization contract and alignment control for enhanced imag-
ing number’.
33. On using AI and Data Analytics in Pharmaceutical Research.
Interview with Bryn Roberts by Roberto V. Zicari on 10
September 2018 available from ODBMS Industry Watch
Trends and Information on Big Data, New Data Management
Technologies, Data Science and Innovation at http://www.
odbms.org/blog/2018/09/on-using-ai-and-data-analytics-in-
pharmaceutical-research-interview-with-bryn-roberts/ web-
site visited on 13 July 2019.
34. Ibid.
35. https://www.ibm.com/watson-health/learn/artificial-intelligence-
medicine website visited on 13 July 2019.
36. https://www.research.ibm.com/haifa/dept/vst/mlhls_drugrep.
shtml website visited on 13 July 2019.
37. For example, open source promotes a form of openness
that is based on the motivation to improve one’s coding skills
and be part of a community (Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006);
Carol Rose (1986: 779) explains that the commons can be
about recreational play: Like commerce, then, recreation has
social and political overtones. The contemplation of nature
elevates our minds above the workaday world, and thus helps
us to cope with that very world; recreational play trains us in
the democratic give-and-take that makes our regime function.
Elizabeth and erson highlights the potential of democratic
debate, see Elizabeth Anderson, ‘The Ethical Limitations of
the Market’ Economics and Philosophy 6 (2):179 (1990);
For a real-world experiment, see DECODE project in Europe
https://decodeproject.eu/.
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